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Abstract
This paper considers welfare effects of entry when the incumbent firm behaves like a
Stackelberg leader in the product market. In contrast to the existing literature, we show that
entry may increase welfare for any cost asymmetries between the firms. Using a general
demand function we show the condition for welfare improving entry.
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1. Introduction 
Does entry always increase welfare? In an interesting paper, Klemperer (1988) shows 
that, if the firms compete like Cournot oligopolists, entry reduces welfare if the 
(constant) marginal cost of the entrant is sufficiently higher than that of the incumbent. 
The reason for this result is as follows. On one hand, entry increases the total output in 
the industry, which tends to increase welfare by increasing consumer surplus. On the 
other hand, entry reduces the output of the cost efficient incumbent. Since the entrant is 
cost inefficient than the incumbent, the business stealing effect of entry creates 
production inefficiency in the industry, which tends to reduce welfare under entry. If the 
cost of the entrant is very high compared to the incumbent, the production inefficiency 
effect dominates the total output increasing effect of entry, and entry reduces welfare. 
However, it is well known that either incumbency advantage or cost efficiency 
may allow a firm to be a dominant player in the product market, thus making the 
incumbent a Stackelberg leader in the product market (see, e.g., Dixit, 1980, Basu, 1995, 
Hamilton and Slutsky, 1990 and van Damme and Hurkens, 1999). We show that if the 
incumbent behaves like a Stackelberg leader, entry always increases welfare for the 
demand function considered in Klemperer (1988). Hence, leadership by the incumbent 
eliminates product inefficiency which occurs under Cournot competition.
1 
Using a general demand function we show the condition under which the output 
of the incumbent Stackelberg leader is higher under entry than under no entry,
2 and this 
condition is always satisfied under linear demand function. We show that our basic result 
holds for an arbitrary number of entrants, who behave like Stackelberg followers. Hence, 
our results suggest that entry should be more encouraged in industries with dominant 
incumbent firms, thus may have important implications for competition policies.  
Recently, Ghosh and Saha (2007) consider a model with free entry and extend the 
line of research conducted by Klemperer (1988). They show that entry can be socially 
excessive in the absence of scale economies. However, like Klemperer (1988), Ghosh 
and Saha (2007) also assume that the firms compete like Cournot oligopolists.
3  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model 
and derives the main result of the paper. Section 3 concludes. 
 
2. Cournot vs. Stackelberg competition 
Let us consider an economy with an incumbent and an entrant. Both firms can produce a 
homogeneous product with the constant marginal cost of production  i c . However, each 
consumer incurs a ‘switching cost’  0 > s  for switching from the incumbent’s product to 
the entrant’s product (see, Klemperer, 1988). Therefore, the effective marginal cost of 
the entrant is  i i c c s c > ≡ + ) (.
4 For simplicity, assume that there is no other cost of 
production or entry. We consider two situations to see the effects of entry: (i) when there 
                                                 
1 It follows from Clarke and Collie (2003) that, if the market demand function is linear, entry always 
increases welfare if the firms compete in prices. 
2 While discussing the case of general demand function, Klemperer (1988) shows that entry may always 
reduce welfare by reducing the output of the incumbent. In contrast, we show that in a Stackelberg model, 
entry may never reduce output of the incumbent, and therefore, entry may always increase welfare.  
3 There is another literature, which shows that entry may reduce welfare in the presence of scale economies 
(see, e.g., Stiglitz, 1981, Spence, 1984, Tandon, 1984, Schmalensee, 1976, von Weizsäcker, 1980a, b, 
Mankiw and Whinston, 1986 and Suzumura and Kiyono, 1987). 
4 Instead of switching cost, the different marginal cost of the firms may be the outcome of technological 
differences. For example, if the incumbent is a technology leader, the expiration of patent on one of its old 
technologies may create entry of a firm with relatively higher marginal cost of production.   2
is no entry and the incumbent is monopolist, and (ii) when there is entry and the market 
structure is duopoly. 
Let us assume that the inverse market demand function is  ) (q p , with  0 < ′ p  and 
0 ≤ ′ ′ p , and the notations have the usual meanings.
5  
If the incumbent is monopolist, which is the case under no entry, it maximizes the 
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The equilibrium output of the incumbent is determined by the following equation: 
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2.1. Cournot competition 
Now, consider the output choice under entry when the firms compete like Cournot 
duopolists. 
  The incumbent and the entrant maximize the following expressions respectively 
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The equilibrium outputs of the incumbent and the entrant are determined by solving the 
following expressions: 
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It follows from (2), (5) and (6) that, if the entrant produces positive output, the output of 
the incumbent is lower under entry than under no entry.  
The industry output can be found by adding the equations (5) and (6), which 
gives the condition: 
   0 ) ( ) ( 2 = ′ + + − p q c c q p
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2.2. Stackelberg competition 
Let us now consider the output choice under entry when the incumbent behaves like a 
Stackelberg leader.  
  Given the output choice of the incumbent, the entrant maximizes the following 
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The optimal output of the entrant is determined by the following equation: 
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5 Our assumption on the second derivative of the demand function is sufficient to ensure that the marginal 
revenues of the firms are decreasing with respect to the outputs of the competitors, and it is also enough to 
satisfy the second order conditions for maximization in our analysis. It follows from Bulow et al. (1985) 
that if the marginal revenues of the firms are increasing with respect to the outputs of the competitors, 
which can happen for constant elasticity demand functions, the incumbent produces more under entry than 
under no entry even under Cournot competition. Hence, in this situation, entry always increases welfare 
under Cournot competition.   3




e q q , which shows the entrant’s reaction function, can be found 
from equation (9), and the slope of this implicit function, i.e., 
′ e
e q , is negative. 
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since the incumbent internalizes the output strategy of the entrant, which can be found 




e q q . So, the equilibrium output of the incumbent 
is determined by the following equation: 
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i q p q p q c q q q p .            (11) 
  If the entrant produces positive outputs under both Cournot and Stackelberg 
competition, we get from (5), (6), (9) and (11) that the equilibrium output of the 
incumbent (entrant) is higher (lower) under Stackelberg competition than under Cournot 
competition. The industry output under Stackelberg competition can be found by adding 
the equations (9) and (11). We get that the industry output is higher under Stackelberg 
competition than under Cournot competition, which is also higher than the incumbent’s 
monopoly output. 
So, the outputs of the incumbent and the industry are higher under Stackelberg 
competition compared to Cournot competition, which implies that the possibility of 
welfare reducing entry is lower under the former competition than the latter. However, it 
is yet to see whether entry can increase welfare under Stackelberg competition for any 
cost asymmetries between the firms.  
 
Proposition 1: Assume  i c c = . If the absolute slope of the entrant’s reaction function 
corresponding to the incumbent’s monopoly output, 
m
i q , is not lower than the absolute 
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) ( , the incumbent’s output under Stackelberg 
competition is not lower than its monopoly output if the entrant produces positive output 
in the market. Therefore, in this situation, entry does not reduce welfare under 
Stackelberg competition for any cost asymmetries between the firms. 
Proof: If both firms produce positive outputs then, as the marginal cost of the entrant 
increases, it reduces the entrant’s equilibrium output and increases the equilibrium output 
of the incumbent. So, if the incumbent’s output under Stackelberg competition is greater 
than or equal to its monopoly output when the entrant’s marginal cost is  i c c = , the 
incumbent produces more under entry than under no entry for  i c c > , if the entrant 
produces positive output in the market. 
  If the entrant’s marginal cost is  i c c = , the incumbent, under Stackelberg 
competition, does not produce lower than its monopoly output if and only if 
 0 )) ( ( ≥
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where the left hand side (LHS) of (12) shows the absolute slope of the entrant’s reaction 
function and the right hand side (RHS) of (12) shows the absolute slope of the 
incumbent’s isoprofit curve.
6                        Q.E.D. 
 
  Using (2) and the expression for 
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denominator is negative due to the second order condition of entrant’s profit 
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If the demand function is linear, i.e.,  0 = ′ ′ p , LHS of (13) is equal to RHS of (13). For 


















= . So, both LHS and RHS of (13) are 2. Hence, if the incumbent 
behaves like a Stackelberg leader, entry does not reduce the equilibrium output of the 
incumbent compared to no entry, if the firms have the same marginal cost. Since, higher 
marginal cost of the entrant increases the output of the incumbent, it immediately implies 
that if  i c c > , the output of the incumbent is higher under entry than under no entry.  So, 
unlike Cournot competition, entry under Stackelberg competition does not create 
production inefficiency by reducing the output of the incumbent. As a result, if the 
incumbent behaves like a Stackelberg leader, entry always increases welfare for linear 
demand function considered in Klemperer (1988).  
It must be clear that condition (12) or (13) can also hold for non-linear demand 
functions since, given that 
′ e
e q is negative and the entrant’s equilibrium output is positive, 
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i q p q p q c q p . Since the incumbent internalizes the output strategy of 
the entrant, the incumbent’s marginal profit is positive at the combination of zero output 
of the entrant and the monopoly output of the incumbent, which encourages the 
incumbent to produce more than its monopoly output. While the positive output of the 
entrant reduces the incumbent’s equilibrium output, the incumbent can still find it 
profitable to produce more than its monopoly output under entry.    
The reason for the above finding is as follows. If the incumbent produces its 
monopoly output, it leaves positive residual demand for the entrant. A positive output by 
the entrant reduces price of the product, and destroys the incumbent’s possibility of 
earning its monopoly profit. Since, the positive output by the entrant reduces the price 
anyway, it can induce the incumbent to increase its market share by producing more than 
its monopoly output. The Stackelberg competition provides the incumbent the power to 
commit to this higher output before the output choice of the entrant. Further, the 
incentive for higher production by the incumbent increases with the higher marginal cost 
of the entrant, since the higher marginal cost of the entrant induces the entrant to react 
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less aggressively for a given output of the incumbent. Hence, under Stackelberg 
competition, the incumbent’s commitment to output before the entrant’s output choice 
helps to avoid production inefficiency under entry, thus increasing welfare under entry 
for any cost asymmetries between the firms due to the positive effect of higher 
competition under entry. 
It must be noted that Proposition 1 provides a strong sufficient condition for the 
welfare improving entry. Because, even if (12) does not hold, welfare may increase with 
entry if  i c c > . If both firms produce positive outputs then, as the marginal cost of the 
entrant increases, it increases the equilibrium output of the incumbent. So, the possibility 
of higher output of the incumbent under entry than under no entry is higher for  i c c >  
than for  i c c = . As a result, if  i c c > , a weaker condition than (12) can ensure welfare 
improving entry. 
  As a final remark, if the incumbent behaves like a Stackelberg leader, entry 
increases welfare for any arbitrary number of entrants. As already mentioned, the 
possibility of positive output by the entrant reduces the price of the product, which 
induces the incumbent to produce more than its monopoly output under entry. Since, this 
effect prevails irrespective of the number of entrants, entry under Stackelberg 
competition increases welfare for any arbitrary number of entrants by inducing the 
incumbent to produce more under entry than under no entry. As an example, let us 
consider entry of n firms, where each entrant faces the marginal cost c. If the inverse 
demand function is  bq a p − = , we find that the output of the incumbent under entry is 
b
c c n c a i i
2
) ( − + −
, where  i c  is the marginal cost of the incumbent. Since,  0 = n  
corresponds to the case of no entry, it is immediate that the incumbent’s output is higher 
under entry than under no entry if  i c c >  and the outputs of the entrants are positive. 
  
3. Conclusion 
Assuming Cournot competition, Klemperer (1988) shows that entry reduces welfare in 
the absence of scale economies if the entrant is sufficiently cost inefficient than the 
incumbent. In a free entry model, this research has been extended by Ghosh and Saha 
(2007) to show excessive entry in the absence of scale economies. 
  However, either the incumbency advantage or the cost efficiency may allow the 
incumbent firm to behave like a Stackelberg leader in the product market. We show that 
if the incumbent behaves like a Stackelberg leader, entry can increase welfare for any 
cost asymmetries between the firms. Hence, entry should be more encouraged in 
industries with dominant firms.  
 
References 
Basu, K., 1995, ‘Stackelberg equilibrium in oligopoly: an explanation based on 
managerial incentive’, Economics Letters, 49: 459 – 64. 
Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos and P. Klemperer, 1985, ‘Holding idle capacity to deter entry’, 
The Economic Journal, 95: 178 – 82. 
Clarke, R. and D. Collie, 2003, ‘Product differentiation and the gains from trade under 
Bertrand duopoly’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 36: 658 – 73. 
Dixit, A., 1980, ‘The role of investment in entry deterrence’, Economic Journal, 90: 95 – 
106. 
Ghosh, A. and S. Saha, 2007, ‘Excess entry in the absence of scale economies’, 
Economic Theory, 3: 575 – 86.   6
Hamilton, J. H. and S. M. Slutsky, 1990, ‘Endogenous timing in duopoly games: 
Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria’, Games and Economic Behavior, 2: 29 – 46.  
Klemperer, P., 1988, ‘Welfare effects of entry into markets with switching costs’, The 
Journal of Industrial Economics, XXXVII: 159 – 65. 
Mankiw, A. G. and M. D. Whinston, 1986, ‘Free entry and social inefficiency’, Rand 
Journal of Economics, 17: 48 – 58. 
Schmalensee, R., 1976, ‘Is more competition necessarily good’, Industrial Organisation 
Review, 4: 120 – 21. 
Spence, M., 1984, ‘Cost reduction, competition, and industry performance’, 
Econometrica, 52: 101 – 21. 
Stiglitz, J. E., 1981, ‘Potential competition may reduce welfare’, The American Review, 
71: 184 – 89. 
Suzumura, K. and K. Kiyono, 1987, ‘Entry barriers and economic welfare’, The Review 
of Economic Studies, 54: 157 – 67. 
Tandon, P., 1984, ‘Innovation, market structure, and welfare’, The American Economic 
Review, 74: 394 – 403. 
van Damme, E. and S. Hurkens, 1999, ‘Endogenous Stackelberg leadership’, Games and 
Economic Behavior, 28: 105 – 29. 
von Weizsäcker, C. C., 1980a, ‘A welfare analysis of barriers to entry’, Bell Journal of 
Economics, 11: 399 – 420. 
von Weizsäcker, C. C., 1980b, Barriers to entry: a theoretical treatment, Berlin, 
Springer Verlag.    
 
 
 
 